社会保障民政专项经费管理办法
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社会保障民政专项经费管理办法
社会保障民政专项经费管理办法
北京市财政局
第一条：总则
为加强对民政社会保障专项经费的管理（以下简称专项经费），充分发挥专项经费的使用效益，加快我市民政社会保障体系建设和基础设施改造步伐，特制订本办法。
第二条：专项经费的使用范围
凡由市级财政部门拨付给市级单位和区县财政部门的用于社会救济福利设施改造和修缮、民政事业单位大型设备购置等的专项经费均执行本办法。
第三条：专项经费的申请
凡向市财政部门申请的专项经费，主管部门、单位和区县财政局均应就用款理由、计划规模、预期经济和社会效益及项目完成时间等事项写出申请。主管部门、单位和区县财政部门须在每年第一季度前向市财政部门报送用款计划。用款计划的报送，根据财务统管的要求一律以主管局、
单位的财务（计财）部门名义上报。
第四条：专项经费的审批
市财政部门对主管部门、单位和区县财政局申请的专项经费项目，应根据工作性质、事业发展需要和财力可能统筹安排。在审批时重点对经费项目的中、短期规划进行了审核，对申请项目的内容、计划规模、实施条件、项目概算、完成时间及预期效益等进行可行性综合评估，按照“集
中财力，重点使用”的原则和项目规划的要求安排专项经费，并和用款单位签定经费使用合同。（合同样式附后）
第五条：专项经费的使用、管理和监督
（一）专项经费应严格按照批准的用途专款专用，用款单位要单独立项核算，因特殊情况需改变用途的须事先报请市财政部门批准后，方可使用。
（二）市财政部门按照合同要求，会同主管部门、单位的财务（计财）部门和区县财政局定期对项目实施进度和经费使用情况进行检查和监督，发现问题及时解决。
（三）项目完成后，用款单位应及时向市财政部门报送经费支出情况和使用效益的文字报告，市财政部门会同有关部门对已完成的项目，按合同规定和规划要求及时进行效益考核和验收。
第六条：奖惩
（一）市财政部门对专项经费进行效益考核和项目验收，认为符合合同规定和要求后，对由于加强财务管理，使专项经费发挥最大经济效益和社会效益的用款单位给予适当奖励。
（二）凡由于管理不善，造成项目未按期完成或金额超支的，市财政部门一律不予弥补，对虚报冒领，挪用专款经费或不按规划要求及合同要求使用专项经费以及由于主观原因造成项目拖期或达不到预期目标的，市财政部门在一定时期内暂停审批专项经费。
第七条：本办法由市财政局社保处负责解释。
第八条：本办法自1998年1月1日起执行。
1998年2月17日
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关于基本农田保护示范区监督管理信息化建设工作设想和有关要求
关于基本农田保护示范区监督管理信息化建设工作设想和有关要求
国土资耕函〔2006〕008号
各省、自治区、直辖市国土资源厅（国土环境资源厅、国土资源局、国土资源和房屋管理局、房屋土地资源管理局），新疆生产建设兵团国土资源局：
根据部《关于开展设立基本农田保护示范区工作的通知》（国土资发〔2005〕197号）精神，以及《关于编制基本农田保护示范区建设方案的通知》（国土资厅发〔2006〕42号）的要求，为指导有关县（市、区）开展信息化建设工作，编制好示范区建设方案，部基本农田保护示范区建设协调小组编制了《关于基本农田保护示范区监督管理信息化建设工作设想和有关要求》（见附件），现印发给你们，请遵照执行。
附件：关于基本农田保护示范区监督管理信息化建设工作设想和有关要求
中华人民共和国国土资源部
二○○六年三月二十八日
附件：
关于基本农田保护示范区监督管理信息化建设工作设想和有关要求
根据《关于进一步做好基本农田保护有关工作的意见》（国土资发〔2005〕196号）和《关于开展基本农田保护示范区工作的通知》（国土资发〔2005〕197号）精神，为指导基本农田保护示范区建设实现监督管理信息化及编制好示范区建设方案，特提出以下设想和有关要求。
一、信息化工作思路、目标和步骤
（一）基本思路
以包括基本农田现状信息在内的土地利用现状数据库为基础，建立基本农田保护数据库及基本农田保护管理信息系统，建立国家、省、市、县四级互动的基本农田网络化管理运行体系，实现基本农田保护基础信息与日常更新管理的计算机化、网络化，使各级国土资源管理部门快速准确掌握基本农田现状与利用变化情况，同时通过定期的遥感监测，加强对基本农田保护的监督与管理。
（二）工作目标
通过建立基本农田保护数据库和管理信息系统及其运行维护制度，逐步实现基本农田信息网络化采集、管理、分析、上报的技术体系，保证基本农田信息的现势性，建立基本农田保护监督管理的长效机制。
（三）具体步骤
在本地信息化与电子政务建设总体框架和技术要求下，与已经完成和正在开展的信息化工作统筹安排，逐步实现基本农田保护监督管理信息化。具体任务如下：
1、研制基本农田保护数据库标准。由部统一组织制定基本农田保护数据库标准，规定基本农田数据库的数据内容、分类与编码、数据结构等内容，印发各地执行，规范、指导各示范区基本农田数据库建设。
2、建设基本农田保护数据库。示范区所在县（市、区）国土资源部门根据部统一印发的基本农田保护数据库标准，在土地利用现状数据库的基础上，收集示范区基本农田保护相关信息，并补充到现状数据库中，建立包括示范区区域矢量图、示范区的相关属性信息、整理项目相关信息在内的基本农田数据库。
3、设计开发基本农田保护管理信息系统。由部统一组织设计开发基本农田保护管理信息系统，实现对基本农田保护业务的统一管理和基本农田保护数据的日常更新与信息共享。
4、建立基本农田保护管理信息系统与数据库的运行环境。根据部统一部署以及系统和数据库运行环境的技术要求，在已有信息化基础设施的基础上，示范区所在的各省、市、县国土资源部门建立相应的软硬件环境，并组织相关技术与业务培训。
5、运行维护基本农田管理信息系统和数据库。示范区所在的各省、市、县国土资源部门制订系统运行与维护、数据更新、信息发布、更新信息上报等制度，明确办事程序和责任，对数据库和管理信息系统进行长期的运行维护，对数据库进行日常更新，定期向上一级国土资源部门报送基本农田基本信息和变化信息。
6、建立基本农田保护信息网上公开专栏。示范区所在县（市、区）国土资源部门在基本农田保护数据库及管理信息系统的基础上，充分利用现有国土资源网站，开设基本农田保护专栏（县级国土资源部门没有网站的，专栏在上一级国土资源部门建设），公布确定的基本农田保护区，接受社会监督；通过专栏反馈的各类信息由网站所在的县或市通过基本农田保护示范区管理信息系统及时逐级反馈到上级国土资源部门。
7、利用遥感手段监测基本农田保护情况。除了通过基本农田管理信息系统进行基本农田变化信息反馈外，部将定期统一组织对示范区所在县（市、区）的土地利用遥感监测，及时掌握基本农田保护的建设与利用变化情况，并与相关土地数据库中的数据进行比对，形成监测结果。
二、信息化工作任务分工与经费来源
按照统一标准、分工合作的原则，基本农田保护监督管理信息化建设工作由部与示范区所在省、市、县国土资源部门共同完成，各自承担应做工作所需经费。
基本农田保护数据库标准的研制、基本农田保护管理信息系统的开发、基本农田保护管理信息系统和数据库的部署、基本农田保护情况遥感监测由部统一组织实施，经费由部统一安排。
省级、地（市）级基本农田保护管理信息系统与数据库的运行环境及其运行维护由所在省级、地（市）级的国土资源部门负责，经费自筹。
县级基本农田保护数据库的建设、基本农田保护管理信息系统与数据库运行环境的建立、运行维护、基本农田保护信息网上公开专栏的建设等工作由示范区所在县（市、区）的国土资源部门负责，经费自筹。
三、信息化工作基本要求
（一）示范区建设中信息化建设工作应与部、省、市、县的信息化总体工作部署相一致，与金土工程、土地利用调查工作相结合，以已有信息化工作为基础，统一协调开展工作。
（二）基本农田保护数据库建设必须遵循《基本农田保护数据库标准》，按照国家统一大地坐标系统，形成完整的基本农田保护基本信息库。基本农田保护示范区的图、数须保持一致，数据库中的数据须与乡、村、责任人使用的表、卡、册、图保持一致。
（三）基本农田保护示范区基本信息库建立后，各示范区应使用基本农田保护管理信息系统对基本农田保护和利用变化情况，进行日常管理、更新、逐级上报。当示范区情况发生变化时，示范区基本信息库不得更改。
（四）对已建立基本农田保护管理信息系统，且能够满足示范区管理需要的，可以利用原管理信息系统进行示范区管理；对已有管理信息系统但不能够满足示范区管理需要的，应对原系统进行升级改造以适应示范区管理需要；对没有管理信息系统的，使用部统一开发的基本农田保护管理信息系统。
（五）地方各级国土资源部门要建立基本农田保护示范区信息系统运行管理办法；县、乡、村要安排专门人负责基本农田信息的编报；网站专栏要有专人负责。
（六）在基本农田保护示范区管理信息系统的使用过程中，如出现基本农田被占用等变化情况，由责任人向村、乡、县逐级上报，并通过示范区管理信息系统和网络逐级报送到上级国土资源部门。
（七）除运行维护与遥感监测外，基本农田保护监督管理信息化建设工作应在两年内基本完成。
四、示范区建设方案编制要求
编制基本农田保护示范区建设方案（信息化部分）的具体要求：
（一） “示范区基本情况”部分
要说明示范区所在省、市、县的信息化建设现状，包括已有数据库、尤其基本农田相关数据库的内容及数据库更新情况；已有信息系统、尤其与基本农田保护有关的信息系统主要功能、运行与使用情况；信息化主要设备与使用情况；即将开展的与基本农田保护相关的信息系统建设计划；办公人员信息化技能水平以及专门的信息化机构建设情况等等，并根据示范区信息化建设要求进行客观评价。
（二） “总体目标”部分
要紧密围绕以建设促保护的基本思路，从建立基本农田保护的长效机制、提高基本农田保护工作效率、保证基本农田信息的现势性、规范业务管理、实现对基本农田保护监督管理角度出发，提出明确的信息化建设总体目标。
（三）“主要建设任务”中的“监督管理信息化”部分
第一，要根据“信息化工作思路、目标和步骤”中由地方承担的工作，提出实现目标的具体工作任务。
第二，要根据工作任务拟定信息化建设总体技术方案，在数据库信息采集、更新与上报，基本农田保护管理信息系统、数据库运行环境、信息发布栏目功能设置，以及运行维护和管理等方面进行初步的设计，提出拟采取的工作方法和技术路线。
第三，要初步提出工作计划，提出阶段工作内容和阶段工作成果。
（四） “资金估算”部分
要明确信息化资金预算与来源，根据明确的测算标准、测算依据、实物工作量，分类填报资金预算情况。
（五） “保障措施”部分
要结合实际情况，在组织、资金、技术、人员、实施等方面提出切实可行的信息化建设保障措施。
Chapter VIII
Strengthening of the Multilateral System
Art. 23 of the DSU deals, as indicated by its title, with the “Strengthening of the Multilateral System”. Its overall design is to prevent WTO Members from unilaterally resolving their disputes in respect of WTO rights and obligations. It does so by obligating Members to follow the multilateral rules and procedures of the DSU. Art. 23 of the DSU reads:
“Strengthening of the Multilateral System
1. When Members seek the redress of a violation of obligations or other nullification or impairment of benefits under the covered agreements or an impediment to the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements, they shall have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of this Understanding.
2. In such cases, Members shall:
(a) not make a determination to the effect that a violation has occurred, that benefits have been nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements has been impeded, except through recourse to dispute settlement in accordance with the rules and procedures of this Understanding, and shall make any such determination consistent with the findings contained in the panel or Appellate Body report adopted by the DSB or an arbitration award rendered under this Understanding;
(b) follow the procedures set forth in Article 21 to determine the reasonable period of time for the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and rulings; and
(c) follow the procedures set forth in Article 22 to determine the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations and obtain DSB authorization in accordance with those procedures before suspending concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements in response to the failure of the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and rulings within that reasonable period of time.”
In this section, to end this book, the author means to take a precise overlook on the nature of obligations under Art. 23 of the DSU as a whole by referring to two panels’ reports in part. In this respect, the Panel in US-Sections 301-310 (DS152) rules: 1
“On this basis [provision of Article 23], we conclude as follows:
(a)It is for the WTO through the DSU process - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine that a WTO inconsistency has occurred (Article 23.2(a)).
(b)It is for the WTO or both of the disputing parties, through the procedures set forth in Article 21 - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine the reasonable period of time for the Member concerned to implement DSB recommendations and rulings (Article 23.2(b)).
(c)It is for the WTO through the procedures set forth in Article 22 - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine, in the event of disagreement, the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations that can be imposed as a result of a WTO inconsistency, as well as to grant authorization for the actual implementation of these suspensions.
Article 23.2 clearly, thus, prohibits specific instances of unilateral conduct by WTO Members when they seek redress for WTO inconsistencies in any given dispute. This is, in our view, the first type of obligations covered under Article 23.
Article 23.1 is not concerned only with specific instances of violation. It prescribes a general duty of a dual nature. First, it imposes on all Members to ‘have recourse to’ the multilateral process set out in the DSU when they seek the redress of a WTO inconsistency. In these circumstances, Members have to have recourse to the DSU dispute settlement system to the exclusion of any other system, in particular a system of unilateral enforcement of WTO rights and obligations. This, what one could call ‘exclusive dispute resolution clause’, is an important new element of Members' rights and obligations under the DSU. Second, Article 23.1 also prescribes that Members, when they have recourse to the dispute settlement system in the DSU, have to ‘abide by’ the rules and procedures set out in the DSU. This second obligation under Article 23.1 is of a confirmatory nature: when having recourse to the DSU Members must abide by all DSU rules and procedures.
Turning to the second paragraph under Article 23, Article 23.2 - which, on its face, addresses conduct in specific disputes - starts with the words ‘[i]n such cases’. It is, thus, explicitly linked to, and has to be read together with and subject to, Article 23.1.
Indeed, two of the three prohibitions mentioned in Article 23.2 - Article 23.2(b) and (c) - are but egregious examples of conduct that contradicts the rules and procedures of the DSU which, under the obligation in Article 23.1 to ‘abide by the rules and procedures’ of the DSU, Members are obligated to follow. These rules and procedures clearly cover much more than the ones specifically mentioned in Article 23.2. There is a great deal more State conduct which can violate the general obligation in Article 23.1 to have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of the DSU than the instances especially singled out in Article 23.2.
Article 23 interdicts, thus, more than action in specific disputes, it also provides discipline for the general process WTO Members must follow when seeking redress of WTO inconsistencies. A violation of the explicit provisions of Article 23 can, therefore, be of two different kinds. It can be caused
(a)by an ad hoc, specific action in a given dispute, or
(b)by measures of general applicability, e.g. legislation or regulations, providing for a certain process to be followed which does not, say, include recourse to the DSU dispute settlement system or abide by the rules and procedures of the DSU.”
Furthermore, as to Art. 23 of the DSU, the Panel in US-Import Measures (DS165) confirms the ruling developed in US-Sections 301-310, and states: 2
“The Panel believes that the adopted Panel Report on United States - Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974 (‘US - Section 301’) has confirmed the crucial importance that WTO Members place on the dispute settlement system of the WTO, as the exclusive means to redress any violations of any provisions of the WTO Agreement. This fundamental principle is embedded in Article 23 of the DSU: …
An important reason why Article 23 of the DSU must be interpreted with a view to prohibiting any form of unilateral action is because such unilateral actions threaten the stability and predictability of the multilateral trade system, a necessary component for "market conditions conducive to individual economic activity in national and global markets" which, in themselves, constitute a fundamental goal of the WTO. Unilateral actions are, therefore, contrary to the essence of the multilateral trade system of the WTO. As stated in the Panel Report on US - Section 301:
‘7.75 Providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system is another central object and purpose of the system which could be instrumental to achieving the broad objectives of the Preamble. Of all WTO disciplines, the DSU is one of the most important instruments to protect the security and predictability of the multilateral trading system and through it that of the market-place and its different operators. DSU provisions must, thus, be interpreted in the light of this object and purpose and in a manner which would most effectively enhance it.’
The structure of Article 23 is that the first paragraph states the general prohibition or general obligation, i.e. when Members seek the redress of a WTO violation, they shall do so only through the DSU. This is a general obligation. Any attempt to seek ‘redress’ can take place only in the institutional framework of the WTO and pursuant to the rules and procedures of the DSU.
The prohibition against unilateral redress in the WTO sectors is more directly provided for in the second paragraph of Article 23. From the ordinary meaning of the terms used in the chapeau of Article 23.2 (‘in such cases, Members shall’), it is also clear that the second paragraph of Article 23 is ‘explicitly linked to, and has to be read together with and subject to, Article 23.1’. That is to say, the specific prohibitions of paragraph 2 of Article 23 have to be understood in the context of the first paragraph, i.e. when such action is performed by a WTO Member with a view to redressing a WTO violation.
We also agree with the US - Section 301 Panel Report that Article 23.2 contains ‘egregious examples of conduct that contradict the rules of the DSU’ and which constitute more specific forms of unilateral actions, otherwise generally prohibited by Article 23.1 of the DSU.
‘[t]hese rules and procedures [Article 23.1] clearly cover much more than the ones specifically mentioned in Article 23.2. There is a great deal more State conduct which can violate the general obligation in Article 23.1 to have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of the DSU than the instances especially singled out in Article 23.2.’
The same Panel identified a few examples of such instances where the DSU could be violated contrary to the provisions of Article 23. Each time a Member seeking the redress of a WTO violation is not abiding by a rule of the DSU, it thus violates Article 23.1 of the DSU.
In order to verify whether individual provisions of Article 23.2 have been infringed (keeping in mind that the obligation to also observe other DSU provisions can be brought under the umbrella of Article 23.1), we must first determine whether the measure at issue comes under the coverage of Article 23.1. In other words, we need to determine whether Article 23 is applicable to the dispute before addressing the specific violations envisaged in the second paragraph of Article 23 of the DSU or elsewhere in the DSU.
Article 23.1 of the DSU provides that the criterion for determining whether Article 23 is applicable is whether the Member that imposed the measure was ‘seeking the redress of’ a WTO violation. …
The term ‘seeking’ or ‘to seek’ is defined in the Webster New Encyclopedic Dictionary as: ‘to resort to, … to make an attempt, try’. This term would therefore cover situations where an effort is made to redress WTO violations (whether perceived or WTO determined violations). The term ‘to redress’ is defined in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as ‘repair (an action); atone for (a misdeed); remedy or remove; to set right or rectify (injury, a wrong, a grievance etc.); obtaining reparation or compensation’. The term ‘redress’ is defined in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as: ‘reparation of or compensation for a wrong or consequent loss; remedy for or relief from some trouble; correction or reformation of something wrong’. The term 'redress' implies, therefore, a reaction by a Member against another Member, because of a perceived (or WTO determined) WTO violation, with a view to remedying the situation.
Article 23.1 of the DSU prescribes that when a WTO Member wants to take any remedial action in response to what it views as a WTO violation, it is obligated to have recourse to and abide by the DSU rules and procedures. In case of a grievance on a WTO matter, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is the only means available to WTO Members to obtain relief, and only the remedial actions envisaged in the WTO system can be used by WTO Members. The remedial actions relate to restoring the balance of rights and obligations which form the basis of the WTO Agreement, and include the removal of the inconsistent measure, the possibility of (temporary) compensation and, in last resort, the (temporary) suspension of concessions or other obligations authorised by the DSB (Articles 3.7 and 22.1 of the DSU). The latter remedy is essentially retaliatory in nature.”
【NOTE】:
1. See, in detail, WT/DS152/R/7.38-7.46.
2. See, in detail, WT/DS165/R/6.13-6.23.
List of References
1 Sources of Legal Texts: http://www.wto.org; WTO Secretariat: The WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures (Second Edition), CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2001.
